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1 How can research inform
negotiations?
1.1 The problematic negotiating timetable
If the Doha Round proceeds in the same way as its
predecessor, informing the negotiating process with
research results will not be easy. TheUruguay Round
made erratic progress. A Draft Final Act had been
produced by the end of 1991, but the agricultural
proposals were rejected by the European Union
(EU) (Croome 1995: 328). There followed two years
in which most of the “action” took place in bilateral
talks between the EU and the United States (USA)
from which other states were largely excluded. Even
when the formal negotiations were re-launched in
July 1993, there were at least three tracks: the
discussion in the formal General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) groups; the personal
“facilitating” of the new GATT Director General,
Peter Sutherland, who ‘kept up a punishing series of
whirlwind visits to top-level political leaders in the
major countries’ (Croome 1995: 349), and bilateral
negotiations between the EU and USA, with their
respective chief negotiators, Sir Leon Brittan and
Mickey Kantor, having from November ‘a crucial
series of meetings ... that were to continue with only
short breaks over a period of more than three weeks’
(Croome 1995: 364).
In other words, while some broad positions had
been established by 1991, many of the critical
details were not agreed until the final months,
weeks (and even hours) of the 11-year marathon.
Many of these details were hammered out in fora
from which the majority of GATT members were
excluded. Some of the non-actionable special and
differential treatment (SDT) provisions that are
causing the greatest developing country bitterness
were hatched in this way.
The Doha dynamic will probably be similar
because it appears to be inherent to the task of
negotiating a wide range of complex provisions
simultaneously. There can be no agreement until
the major World Trade Organization (WTO)
members have obtained compromises with which
they can live, and then there is a strong imperative
to finalise the deal as quickly as possible before this
consensus is disturbed. John Croome, a close
observer of the process, attributes a significant part
of the final success in the Uruguay Round to PeterIDS Bulletin Vol 34 No 2 2003
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Sutherland’s refusal to countenance any further
delay (Croome 1995). A consequence is that all
other members have to scuttle around to establish
their willingness to accept the compromises and to
secure their own interests.
This would not be such a great problem if due
provision for development concerns could be
agreed at an earlier stage: any last-minute dotting
of “i”s and crossing of “t”s would then be applicable
only to the extent that it was in conformity with the
agreed development principles. Unfortunately, this
does not look a very likely outcome at the time of
writing. The reasons for this pessimism become
clear when one considers the following:
n To be effective, any development provisions
must be enforceable within the WTO (in the
sense of Section 3.1 of the first article in this
Bulletin).
n In the absence of agreed details to any WTO
rule changes, such a guarantee can be provided
only in broad terms.
n In the absence of agreement on sub-groups of
developing countries, these broad, enforceable
provisions would apply either to all developing
countries or just to the least developed countries.
n The industrialised countries are unwilling,
currently, to agree general exemptions, and
among the reasons identified by Claire
Melamed (this volume) are that they want to
link them to the negotiations of substance and
they are unwilling to agree them for all
developing countries.
n The developing countries are unwilling to
discuss differentiation and graduation, at least
until substantial offers are on the table, and are
reluctant to link provisions which, to their
mind, “restore the balance” to negotiations on
further WTO rules.
From an analytical view, too, broad provisions are
not necessarily desirable even if they were attainable.
The “ideal” would be a set of precisely drafted
modulations that respond to specific development
interests. The crux of the problem is that it is not
possible to craft such precise modulations until the
scope of new rules is known in some detail, by
which time it will probably be infeasible either to
complete the research in time or to feed the results
in to the, by then almost complete, negotiations.
1.2 What are the researchable issues?
Given the timetabling problem, research and
negotiation will probably need to move on parallel
tracks, as suggested in the first article, at least for
the time being. And research will need to operate at
three levels to:
1. establish the extent to which there do exist
development principles, for which a reasonably
strong consensus exists, that would provide an
appropriate basis for WTO- or agreement-wide
provisions for broad categories of states;
2. identify the development shortcomings of the
current texts which are either already causing
problems or could do so if the Doha Round
were to continue on the same trajectory, and to
frame specific WTO rules that would address
these problems, including the countries and/or
socio-economic groups that they would cover;
3. undertake country-specific analysis on the trade
policy dimension of each member’s
development strategies and the appropriate
multilateral framework that would provide a
supportive environment.
This article is concerned primarily with the second
of these three. The first is being widely addressed;
the problem seems to be not one of a lack of
interest, but of a lack of consensus. The third is of
clear importance and is being followed up in a
range of country-level exercises (see Prowse 2002).
The remainder of this article sets out an analytical
framework within which specific elements of the
WTO agreements and of the Doha agenda can be
classified (and reclassified once more is known) to
identify the types of treatment that might be
important. The aim is to provide a two-way link
between the research and the negotiation tracks:
classification will clarify the types of research that
need to be undertaken, and the form of presenting
results most appropriate to influencing texts so that
they are relevant to the problems identified.
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2 The concept of differentiation
2.1 Why differentiate?
There is a wide range of circumstances in which
some form of differentiation between WTO
members is desirable; that is clear from the
preceding six articles. In the case of agriculture, for
example, a common development problem has
been a gross under-investment and policy neglect
of the sector. This situation is clearly very different
from that which has underpinned the Agreement
on Agriculture, which aims to discipline the
substantial trade-distorting subsidies of the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) states. In the cases of
competition policy and government procurement,
the issue is the plausibility of industrialised
countries’ willingness to accept rules that would
address significant developing country concerns.
Even if multilateral rules failed to address these key
concerns they could still have merit, but there is no
reason to presume that they will provide an
appropriate balance of risks and rewards for all
countries. In the case of intellectual property
rights, the Commission on Intellectual Property
Rights has demonstrated why rules that are
appropriate to some WTO members might not be
desirable for others (CIPR 2002).
In short, the presumption is that “one size doesn’t
fit all”, with the corollary that there will be an
underlying tension between two legitimately
desirable outcomes of any WTO negotiations:
n to allow flexibility for the specific circumstances
of members;
n to ensure precision so that the rules provide an
effective discipline.
Differentiation is all about balancing these two
goals. It was argued in the first article that there is
an increased need for ex ante agreement on
actionable differentiation because dispute
settlement is now binding. Hence, far from the
Uruguay Round sounding the death-knell of SDT,
it gave the concept of differentiation a new lease of
life. The Doha decision to move further into
“behind the border” trade-related rules has merely
made the task more necessary and complex.
The economic case
Historically, the case for SDT was couched largely
in economic terms and is associated with the
structuralist school. The desire to make Doha a
“development” round places a similar emphasis on
economics, but without the ability to translate this
into a set of relatively simple rules of the game.
The background to the Uruguay Round was the rise
of the Washington Consensus in place of policies
that purported to reflect a structuralist analysis.
Much attention was given to the shortcomings of
the old policies in achieving the intended results.
Now, it is the effectiveness of the Washington
Consensus that is being questioned, at least in the
sense that the design of these policies needs to be
adapted to deal with the issues and problems that
have emerged during implementation.
But while the pendulum has begun to swing, it has
certainly not yet reached the stage at which there is
a coherent, all-embracing, “alternative view” of
economic development which would command
sufficient support to underpin generalised
differentiation within the WTO. Nor, possibly, will
it ever do so. The world has moved on, and the
inadequacies of simple, all-embracing paradigms
are better understood.
Consequently, it is much harder to make an economic
case for WTO-wide differentiation that applies equally
to all non-OECD states. What is appropriate within
the context of the Agreement on Agriculture may not
be necessary, or even desirable, in relation to clothing
and textiles. Even differentiation that would be
common to both may not apply equally to Brazil,
Thailand, India and Ghana. The case-by-case
approach of the preceding functional articles is more
appropriate. The principal reason why differentiation
should not be done wholly on an ad hoc basis is
institutional or political rather than economic.
The political case
The fundamental political argument for enhanced
SDT is that closure in the Doha Round may be
impossible to achieve without it. Or, rather, closure
in the Doha Round on the basis of reasonably
precise new rules and a continuation of binding
dispute settlement may be unlikely. For there to be
closure, there must be consensus, and for there to
be consensus one of two conditions must be
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satisfied. Either all members must acquiesce in the
rules that have been proposed, or there must be let-
out clauses for those that do not acquiesce.
Consequently, it is unlikely that by the end of the
Doha Round countries will be willing to put their
trust in vague phrases, which might subsequently be
defined in unexpected ways by a Dispute Settlement
Panel. And sufficient of them are likely to resist being
“bought off” by non-actionable promises of extra-
WTO support to prevent a consensus being reached.
2.2 What form of differentiation?
The different paths to differentiation
Differentiation can be applied through different
mechanisms, in different senses, and in contingent
ways. As explained in the first article, there are
several mechanisms to differentiate between WTO
members, not all of which have traditionally been
covered by the term “SDT” (or are being discussed
in the Committee on Trade and Development). One
approach is to limit the scope of dispute settlement.
This could be organised by rule: some parts of the
WTO texts could be excluded from dispute
settlement. Or it could be organised by country
group (as implied by some current SDT): some
WTO members could be protected from being
pursued in dispute settlement. The positive-list
approach adopted during the services negotiations
represents another major avenue, whilst a wider use
of plurilateral agreements would be a third. There
seems to be no clear analytical reason to prefer one
approach to another except in terms of their results.
While the SDT approach may have the potential to
achieve more substantial results than the other
methods, if events prove otherwise then this
assessment would need to be changed.
Research on the Doha issues should therefore keep
all possible routes for differentiation in mind. The
ideal output from research that identifies areas in
which differentiation is desirable would be a list of
all the possible ways in which it could be provided
(with their relative merits). It will remain relevant
as the negotiations progress and some routes begin
to appear more feasible than others.
To take the example of the Agreement on Agriculture,
ConstantineMichalopoulos (this volume) has shown
one clear objective to be the revision of Article 6.2 (at
least for some activities in some countries), because it
is subject to the wholly inappropriate budget limit of
a country’s 1992 subsidy level. This could be
achieved in different ways. If there were to be a
Development Box in the new agreement, that might
be an appropriate place to deal with developing
country subsidies to agriculture. Alternatively, the
references to SDT could remain, as they are at
present, scattered throughout the text of the
Agreement on Agriculture, but appropriate changes
would be made to Article 6.2 itself. Yet again, Article
13 (on due restraint) could be amended to provide
strong guarantees to developing countries against the
use of dispute settlement if they were to exceed their
1992 subsidy levels.
Not only are there multiple routes for differentiation,
but there are also different senses in which the term
should be applied. The type of differentiation that is
needed will depend upon the provisions of the text
being varied. In some cases, the only differentiation
that is sufficiently robust will be a de jure right for
specified countries to do something that other
countries are not allowed to do, or to be exempt
from having to do things that other countries have to
do, or to demand action from other countries. In
other cases, however, a de facto rather than a de jure
approach may suffice. Effectively, the positive-list
approach provides de facto justification for some
countries to impose more restrictions on some areas
of trade than do others.
Yet a third aspect of differentiation is whether it is
“free-standing” or links an obligation and a right. The
underlying strategy of the WTO approach of
negotiating Rounds that represent a “single
undertaking” is to establish such links. Each member
accepts its obligations to change its own domestic
laws in the knowledge of what other members for
their part have agreed to do. But implementation is
not always quite what had been expected: the
phasing of liberalisation under the Agreement on
Textiles and Clothing is a case in point.
One way to overcome developing country
complaints that their “reasonable expectations” have
not been fulfilled would be to make the same links
more specific. The implementation of some rules by
one member (or group of members) could be made
contingent upon the actions of other members. An
example would be to link the agricultural market
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access barriers of developing countries and the
subsidies of industrialised countries. A case can be
made that developing countries should not
necessarily offer unrestricted access to the heavily
subsidised agricultural products of industrialised
countries. It is unlikely that the Doha Round will
substantially eliminate such subsidies (which
include transfers from consumers forced to pay
artificially high prices because of market access
barriers as well as tax-payer transfers). Hence, the
implementation of any reduction in developing
country bound tariffs on agriculture could be linked
explicitly to progress on OECD subsidy reduction.
Positive and negative differentiation
One further important distinction is between what
might be termed “negative” and “positive”
differentiation. Most of the actionable SDT in the
WTO is of the negative variety. It relieves developing
countries of certain obligations (or provides a
permissive framework whereby the industrialised
countries, if they choose to do so, can discriminate
in their trade policy in favour of developing
countries). The WTO provisions for positive SDT,
specific pledges of support for technology transfer,
priority food aid allocation or financial and technical
assistance, are largely unenforceable.
Both forms of assistance are required to enable
developing countries to benefit from trade
opportunities; the question is how each can best be
provided. Is differentiation within the WTO that is
limited to negative SDT an adequate goal? How far
is it feasible, or desirable, for the more positive
agenda of support to trade development to be dealt
with in the WTO context?
The answers are related to the role of the WTO in
achieving a predictable, liberal world trade
environment. Any country can unilaterally liberalise
its trade policy, open its government procurement,
or establish an effective competition policy. The key
contributions of theWTO to such processes are that:
n it links changes in one country’s trade policy to
those in another;
n it consequently helps governments to build a
domestic consensus in favour of change;
n it increases the credibility of change by “locking in”;
n and it achieves all three of these partly by
having penalties for countries that break the
agreed rules.
Developing countries ceteris paribus stand to gain as
much as any other member from these
contributions, or arguably more (since they would
tend to fare worse in bilateral negotiations with a
stronger partner). But, apart from providing a
negotiating and conciliation forum, the WTO’s role
is essentially negative: members agree to take
positive actions, and the WTO provides sanctions
to deter recidivism.
An important part of differentiation must be to
provide a defence against this negative sanction in
cases where it is not warranted on developmental
grounds. By the same token, it should provide a
clear message that it is developmentally desirable
for country X not to comply with agreed rules,
otherwise the credibility-enhancing feature of
“locking in” will be reversed.
Hence, negative SDT is a legitimate and, arguably,
the central part of developmental differentiation
within the WTO. The issue of positive SDT is more
problematic. Unless the WTO is to be made a
development institution, with a vastly enhanced
budget, and larger and differently skilled staff, the
implementation of any positive financial or
technological trade support will be the
responsibility of other organisations. And the
world’s trade ministers cannot bind the actions of
their finance and aid ministers in setting the policies
of the International Monetary Fund, World Bank,
World Food Programme, etc. Still less can they
influence the behaviour of private firms. There is,
however, one sense in which the WTO could agree
actionable, positive SDT. This emerges from the
analytical framework described in the next section.
3 Analytical criteria for new
special and differential treatment
Effective SDT must link differentiation to a specific
rule and development problem. This means it is
likely to vary between country groups and issues.
How can it be designed in a coherent way? Figure
1 presents a decision-making tree to assess the
ways in which different types of problem might
lead to various solutions.
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3.1 Developmentally undesirable rules
The first step is to identify the development effects
of a proposed rule and differentiate accordingly.
This is the question that has traditionally been
asked of SDT: should developing countries apply
the same rules as industrialised ones?
Figure 1 identifies two broad reasons why the answer
might be “no”. One relates to types of country. For
example, a case has been made that because small
economies are more vulnerable to global volatility
they have a legitimate need to provide themselves
with a wider range of government interventions
(Commonwealth Secretariat/World Bank 1999).
Alternatively, the issue could be on the effects of rules
for a particular economic group (resource-poor
farmers) or products (staple foods).
The solution might differ between these. Clearly, in
the case of country-wide problems the basic selection
criterion would be the characteristics of each WTO
member. It is for this reason that the small-island
developing countries have pioneered the construction
of the vulnerability index (Commonwealth
Secretariat/World Bank 1999). In some cases,
exemption from or modulation of the rule would be
justifiable for an indefinite period since the
fundamental characteristics of the economy would
not change. But in other cases the fundamental
problem might be that implementation would take
longer (because of the need to create new, WTO-legal
ways to achieve the same objectives).
In the case of vulnerable groups or commodities,
differentiation could be available, in principle, to all
countries that contain significant groups of this kind.
Article 6.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture provides
an example of possible phraseology where it talks
about the exemption from reduction of ‘agricultural
input subsidies generally available to low-income or
resource-poor producers in developing country
Members’. The presumption would be that this sort
of differentiation would be permanent.
The assumption has tended to be that rules that are
not developmentally undesirable should be applied
uniformly by WTO members, but the analysis in
this Bulletin and elsewhere suggests that this is no
longer appropriate. Transparency in government
procurement, for example, is not undesirable in its
own right; the question raised by Giovanna Fenster
(this volume) is whether or not the opportunity
cost of ensuring transparency exceeds the gains.
3.2 High opportunity costs
Hence, in the case of rules that are not
developmentally undesirable in themselves, the
next step is to distinguish between two different
types of “cost of compliance”:
n the more traditional “cost” that the proposed new
rule is politically unacceptable to a country; and
n the newer problem that implementation may
incur financial, technical or human resource
costs that are either beyond the scope of
government or have a high opportunity cost.
In cases where implementation is costly, it is
unreasonable to expect it to occur unless these
costs are met in some way or another. The degree
to which the WTO could tolerate non-compliance
will be affected by the disruption to world trade
that is likely to result. In the case of poor countries
accounting for a small share of trade, non-
compliance is unlikely to impose any significant
costs on third parties. For example, while it may be
the case that Malawi would benefit from having in
place customs valuation procedures compatible
with the WTO code, if the opportunity cost of
compliance is considered to be too high will the
world trading system be adversely affected in any
substantial way by non-compliance?
In cases where non-compliance would not impose
significant costs it could be permitted indefinitely.
Depending upon the specificities of the case,
compliance could either be left to subsequent
negotiations or some objective criterion could be
identified, which would have to be achieved before
compliance were required. The latter would
obviously be preferable, but it might be difficult to
implement. What, for example, would be the
appropriate criterion for requiring implementation
of a customs valuation code? Would it be income
per head, volume of trade, level of government
expenditure?
The example cited by Peter Holmes (this volume)
provides a further option. He argues that only those
countries with a basic domestic competition policy
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would be able to benefit, in practice, from
multilateral cooperation to attack anti-competitive
behaviour. In this case, therefore, compliance could
be voluntary: when a country decides that the
benefits of compliance exceed the costs, it complies.
In other cases, where the circumstances of the
country are such that other WTO members are not
willing to acquiesce in indefinite SDT, there could
be a case for linking compliance to the provision of
appropriate financial and technical support. What
is being proposed here is that:
n in cases whereWTOmembers believe that, say,
Kenya is too important a trader to be excluded
from an agreement, but also accept that
n Kenya cannot currently afford to comply, it
makes sense to argue that
n the international community has an interest in
facilitating compliance by the provision of
appropriate support.
Formulations such as these would overcome the
structural problem that the WTO cannot commit
those bodies that would be involved in providing
support. Formally, the decision by trade ministers
of EU, USA and Japan in the WTO that Kenya
needs technical and financial assistance would not
bind the finance ministers of EU, USA and Japan to
agree to this when meeting in the World Bank. But
it would establish a link, and would guarantee to
Kenya that it would not be forced to comply if the
resources did not materialise. The result might still
be sub-optimal from a broad development
perspective (in which the best outcome might be
considered the provision of sufficient resources that
Kenya can comply). But, at least within the narrow
parameters of the WTO, Kenya’s situation would
not have been worsened by making it choose
between inappropriate “implementation” or
vulnerability to a trade dispute.
3.3 Politically difficult compliance
What if implementation does not impose costs and
there is no consensus that it is developmentally
undesirable? This is the pragmatic case for SDT. It
relates to cases where, say, the Indian government
considers a rule likely to have developmentally
undesirable effects, even though this is not a line
supported by large sections of “the wider
development community”. Or the proposed rule
may not be considered to be developmentally
undesirable, but for other reasons it is simply
unacceptable to the government of India. The
principal reason for agreeing SDT in such cases is the
pragmatic one that, negotiations having failed, there
will not be a consensus for new rules without it.
The purpose of Figure 1 is to identify what type of
SDT might be most appropriate in such cases. A
distinction is made over whether or not a country
is simply not yet ready to move in the direction
suggested or whether it has objective reasons,
linked to the current state of world rules, for not
moving. The appropriate SDT measures will differ.
The example given above on food security provisions
within the Agreement on Agriculture while OECD
agricultural distortions remain in force is relevant. A
strong case can be made that it would be foolhardy,
and politically very controversial, for food-insecure
countries to open up their markets to imports that
are made artificially cheap by the distortions of
OECD countries. According to estimates by the
OECD Secretariat, the OECD’s total agricultural
producer support estimate (PSE) in 2001 was
equivalent to 31 per cent of total farm receipts
(OECD 2002: Annex Table 2). This compares with a
figure of 38 per cent in 1986–1988 (the base period
for the Uruguay Round subsidy cuts). The reduction
from 38 per cent to 31 per cent is smaller than the 20
per cent cut in aggregate producer subsidies to which
the industrialised WTO members committed
themselves in the Uruguay Round.
Such subsidies have depressed the world price of
various temperate agricultural goods, of which
cereals are probably the most important. In 2001
the OECD PSE stood at 36 per cent for wheat and
as much as 81 per cent for rice (OECD 2002:
Annex Table 3). It would be appropriate to allow
food-insecure countries relief from market access
and subsidy reduction commitments for as long as
world market prices fail to reflect real costs of
production. Given that PSEs are calculated
regularly by the OECD, they could provide an
appropriate benchmark. For example,
implementation might be required once the
OECD’s average PSE had been reduced to the
89
current levels of Australia (4 per cent) or New
Zealand (1 per cent).
Traditional measures should be sufficient in other
cases, where a country is not willing to move as far
or as fast as others; it can draw on objective criteria
to justify this, and other WTO members are willing
to agree SDT in order to achieve a consensus. These
“traditional measures” include extended transition
periods and commitments that are proportional to
those adopted by other countries. The expectation
is that this modulation would be eroded over time.
4 Applying the research findings
The implication of this analysis is that there are
many competing indicators around which SDT
groups could coalesce. It is evident that most
developing countries will be keenly interested in
ensuring that the one selected is the “right”
combination (which includes them as members!),
as will many industrialised countries (but with the
opposite goal). The debates that have already
occurred in relation to the Development Box
proposal for the Agreement on Agriculture
illustrate the practical realities of attempting to
achieve agreed, meaningful differentiation within
the WTO. No sooner has a coherent formulation
been proposed, than states that might be excluded
lobby to have the criteria altered in such a way as
to cover their specific circumstances.
These problems are not fundamentally different in
kind from those applying to any effective SDT. We
have already seen in the non-progress of the
Committee on Trade and Development that the
much simpler approach of wide-ranging SDT for all
developing countries faces formidable problems.
Hence, “political feasibility” is not a criterion that
favours one analytical approach over another.
While the complexity and divisiveness of the
approach sketched in Figure 1 brings its own
problems, it also provides the seed of a solution.
While “tailored” groups will exclude states that may
wish to be members, the resulting friction may be
dissipated if there are multiple new groups with
states excluded from some being members of others.
Since none of the pre-existing WTO-recognised
groups is likely to overlap very closely with all of the
sub-groups requiring differential treatment, and
since no process exists within theWTO to forge new,
restricted-membership groupings, the whole process
is likely to be fraught with political difficulty. But the
same reasoning can be applied to SDT group
formation as to GATT/WTO negotiations. The
principal reason for favouring broad rounds of
negotiations, despite their horrendous complexity, is
that they maximise the likelihood of cross-cutting
gains for all parties. By the same token, new-style
SDT in several different areas is more likely to result
in many developing countries being “winners” in
one area or another and, to this extent, to reduce the
political difficulty of introducing the innovation of
restricted-group formation.
So, “more complexity” could turn out to be more
workable than “less complexity”! In any case, from a
research perspective the complexity derives from the
subject matter, not from an attempt to influence the
negotiations. The concept of SDT actually provides a
port of entry to examining the development
implications of new trade rules, especially those that
apply behind the border and not to goods. And if
Doha lasts for the rest of the decade, that will not be
too long for the research that is required!
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